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- Scritto da Antonio Mangani
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PubbliTesi - La Tesi
What It Is Like to Think: The Existence and Nature of Cognitive Phenomenology
Scheda Sintetica
Autore: Antonio Mangani
Relatore: Alberto Voltolini
Università: Università degli Studi di Torino
Facoltà: Dipartimento di Filosofia e Scienze della Educazione
Corso: Laurea Magistrale in Filosofia
Data di Discussione: 30/10/2025
Voto: 110 cum laude
Disciplina: Filosofia della mente
Tipo di Tesi: Ricerca
Altri Relatori: Elvira di Bona
Lingua: Inglese
Grande Area: Area Umanistica
Dignità di Stampa: Si
Descrizione:
In philosophy of mind, it is widely acknowledged that the domain of phenomenal states — those in which there is something it feels like to be in them — includes at least certain sensory experiences. For instance, there is something it feels like to smell lavender or to experience a stomachache. But is there also something it feels like to consciously think, to deliberate, to judge, to remember, or to believe?
In other words, does cognition possess a phenomenology of its own, and if so, what is its nature?
According to the dominant paradigm in twentieth-century analytic philosophy of mind, mental states are divided into two categories. On one side are the propositional attitudes — such as beliefs, desires, and thoughts — characterized by intentional or representational properties but lacking phenomenal character.
On the other side are mental states with a distinctive phenomenal character yet without intentionality, such as perceptual experiences, emotions, moods, bodily sensations, o ...